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Abstract - A series of monte carlo studies were performed to as­
sess the extent to which different inference procedures robustly 
output reasonable belief values in the context of increasing 
levels of judgmental imprecision. It was found that, when com­
pared to an equal-weights linear model, the Bayesian procedures 
are more likely to deduce strong support for a hypothesis. But, 
the Bayesian procedures are also more likely to strongly support 
the wrong hypothesis. Bayesian techniques are more powerful, but 
are also more error prone. 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Reasoning under uncertainty often involves a great deal of 
judgmental imprecision. The subjective (or data base retrieved) 
uncertainty estimates that serve as the ingredients of an uncer­
tainty calculus are often perceived as arbitrary, imprecise or 
uncertain. One consequence of this judgmental imprecision is 
that many decision makers (and researchers) avoid using an ex­
plicit uncertainty calculus for fear of being subject to a gar­
bage in-garbage out problem. For instance, in applied decision 
analysis one often finds resistance to using decision analytic 
models because subjective assessments are viewed with suspicion. 
This paper examines the garbage in-garbage out problem. In par­
ticular, this paper examines the extent to which several dif­
ferent inference procedures are robustly accurate in the context 
of increasing levels of judgmental imprecision. 
2.0 METHOD AND RESULTS 
currently, we are engaged in a series of monte carlo simulations. 
Although the analysis has just begun, the results to date show an 
interesting and stable pattern when comparing Bayesian techniques 
with some other simpler inference procedures. The best way to 
describe the methodology is to present the details of a single 
monte carlo run. Following this, variations on this prototypical 
example are discussed. 
1. The research was supported in part by a grant from the Na­
tional Science Foundation under Grant NSF-EET-8820124 and by the 
Center for Excellence in Command, Control, Communications, and 
Intelligence at George Mason University. The Center's general 
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tive Technology, MITRE Corporation, the Defense Communications 
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2.1 The Prototypical Example: Method 
This run involved an inference problem with one hypothesis (H) 
node and four evidence nodes (A-D). Each node is hi-valued. A 
true probability distribution was defined by randomly assigning 
(from 0-1 uniform distribution) a value to each instan�e of 
P(H=T), P(A=TIH), P(B=TIHA), P(C=TIHAB), and P(D=TIHABC). In 
addition, an underlying distribution of belief values was also 
assigned by taking each of the probability statements used to 
define the probability distribution and adding some random error. 
For instance, for P(B=TIH=F, A=T) we would set 
B(B=TIH=F, A=T) = P(B=TIH=F, A=T) + error. 
For this run the error distribution was a uniform. Specifically, 
where 
B(xly) = min + (max-min)*RND, 
min = maximum[.00001, P(xly)-(range/2)] 
max = minimum[.99999, P(xly)+(range/2)]. 
Here P(xly) is the true probability, B(xly) is the belief value 
or assessed probability, RND is a random number and "range" is 
the range of the error distribution. 
Once calculated, the belief values defined a fully-specified and 
coherent distribution over the possible states. The inputs to 
each of the alternative inference procedures were derived from 
this underlying distribution of belief values. 
For each inference procedure and possible evidential state 
(combination of values for A-D), the relative belief (RB) for H=T 
vs. H=F was calculated as follows. For each evidential state, 
relative belief corresponds to the updated or posterior belief 
value that would be generated by each inference procedure. 
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Proper Bayes. For each evidential state, relative belief was I calculated by 
RB(H=TIABCD) = {B(H=T & ABCD)/[B(H=T & ABCD) + B(H=F & ABCD)]}. II 
Naive Bayes. For each evidential state, relative belief was cal­
culated by 
RB(H=TIABCD) = 
B(H=T)*B(AIH=T)*B(BIH=T)*B(CIH=T)*B(DIH=T) 
B(H=T)*B(AIH=T)*B(BIH=T)*B(CIH=T)*B(DIH=T) + 
B(H=F)*B(AIH=F)*B(BIH=F)*B(CIH=F)*B(DIH=F) 
2. A notational note. An expression such P (A=T I H=T&BC) is a 
template for a set of expressions. I n  th i s  case,  
P(A=TIH=T, B=T, C=T), P(A=TIH=T, B=T, C=F), • • •  are instances of this 
template. 
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strong Naive Bayes. This was calculated in the same way as Naive 
Bayes with the exception that an evidence item x was dropped from 
the calculation whenever 2/3<B(xiH=T)/B(xiH=F)<3/2. 
Simple Linear. This technique calculates relative belief by 
simply adds pros and cons. The calculation proceeds as follows. 
Start with SL=O. 
If B(H=T)>.5 then SL = SL + 1 
(Sl) else if B(H=T)<.5 then SL = SL - 1. 
For each evidence item x, let LR(x!H) = B(x i H=T)/B(x i H=F). 
If LR(x ! H)>1 then SL = SL + 1 
(52) else if LR{x ! H)<l then SL = SL - 1. 
Finally, normalize by setting RB(H=TjABCD) = (SL+S)/10. 
strong Linear. This was exactly the same as simple Linear except 
that S1 and S2 were replaced by 
If B(H=T)>.7 then SL = SL + 1 
else if B(H=T)<.3 then SL = SL - 1, and 
If LR(x ! H)>(3/2) then SL = SL + 1 
else if LR(xjH)<(2/3) then SL = SL - 1. 
These inference procedures are representative of some of the more 
popular point-valued system found in the uncertain reasoning 
literature. Proper Bayes is often considered to be the normative 
ideal for uncertain inference (e.g., Pearl, 1988). Bayesian ap­
proaches with conditional independence assumptions are often used 
to approximate Proper Bayes. Simple Linear models are often 
recommended, because they are often more accurate that human ex­
perts (e.g., Dawes, 1979). 
Three error measures were used. The first is mean-squared error 
(MSE), sometimes called a Brier score. This measure is of inter­
est because MSE is a nondistorting scoring rule that can be used 
to derive the probability calculus as a normative calculus of 
belief. Expected-MSE is easily calculated since we know (a) the 
true probability of each evidential state, (b) the true probabil­
ity of H=T given each evidential state, and (c) the relative 
belief for H=T given that evidential state. 
The second measure is Pef(Pe+Pc), and is called relative error 
(RE). To calculate RE we first set an upper and lower decision 
threshold (U and L respectively}. For this run, 0=.65 and L=.35. 
Then Pe (probability of error) and Pc (probability of correct 
decision) are calculated as follows: 
and 
Pe = P(RB(H=T)>U j H=F)*P(H=F) + P(RB(H=F)<L I H=T)*P(H=T) 
Pc = P(RB(H=F)>U j H=F)*P{H=F) + P(RB(H=T)<LIH=T)*P(H=T). 
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Since the true probability of each state is known, expected-RE 
was also straightforward to calculate. 
The third measure is the normalized mean difference between the 
distribution of relative belief when H=F vs. when H=T. This 
measure ( d') is commonly used in Signal Detection Theory to 
measure the sensitivity of a signal detector to the presence of a 
signal. Here it measures the "sensitivity" of the inference pro­
cedure to the presence of the hypothesis. From Lehner and Ulvila 
(1990) we note that when U and L are symmetric, d' is ap­
proximately z(1-Pe) +z(Pc) , where z(x) is the z-score for x. 
2. 2 The Prototypical Example: Results 
The following results are based on 1000 cases. Each case in­
volved a different true probability distribution over the pos­
sible states. 
TABLE 1 
EXPECTED MEAN-SQUARED ERROR FOR PROTOTYPICAL EXAMPLE 
Error 
Range 
0. 000 
0. 200 
0. 400 
0. 600 
0. 800 
1. 000 
1. 200 
1. 400 
1. 600 
1. 800 
2. 000 
Simple 
Linear 
0. 171 
0. 175 
0. 178 
0. 191 
0. 202 
0. 230 
0. 259 
0. 276 
0. 287 
0. 293 
0. 296 
Strong Naive 
Linear Bayes 
0. 166 
0. 169 
0. 172 
0. 185 
0. 199 
0. 219 
0. 239 
0. 253 
0. 265 
0. 274 
0. 276 
0. 121 
0. 127 
0. 134 
0. 161 
0. 186 
0. 224 
0. 268 
0. 300 
0. 331 
0. 352 
0. 361 
Strong 
Bayes 
0. 123 
0. 129 
0. 136 
0. 162 
0. 188 
0. 226 
0. 269 
0. 300 
0. 331 
0. 352 
0. 361 
Proper 
Bayes 
0. 088 
0. 094 
0. 108 
0. 137 
0. 163 
0. 210 
0. 264 
0. 303 
0. 345 
0. 370 
0. 387 
Minimum 
Possible 
0. 088 
0. 086 
0. 083 
0. 085 
0. 083 
0. 087 
0. 086 
0. 085 
0. 086 
0. 084 
0. 088 
Table 1 shows the expected-MSE for each technique at increasing 
levels of calibration error (defined by the Error Range) . There 
are several features to note about Table 1. First, there is an 
extra column. The Minimum Possible column indicates the minimum 
possible expected-MSE score. Note that when range = 0 (no 
calibration error) the Proper Bayes technique achieves, as ex­
pected, the minimum possible score. Second, as calibration error 
increases, expected-MSE increases more rapidly for the Bayesian 
than for the linear techiques. This is a robust result which 
we've observed on all our runs. Third, it is worth noting that 
Naive Bayes and Simple Linear, as well as Strong Bayes and Strong 
Linear use exactly the same input values. Consequently, the dif­
ferences between these two pairs of techniques are due entirely 
to how these input values are aggregated into an overall assess­
ment of relative belief. 
Finally, . 25 and . 33 are important thresholds for expected-MSE 
scores. A MSE of . 25 be guaranteed by asserting relative belief 
=. 5 under all conditions. Consequently, according to MSE all the 
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techniques eventually due worse than saying "I don't know. " under 
all circumstances. The Proper Bayes technique, however, is the 
first to pass this threshold. Similarly, a MSE of . 33 can be 
achieve by randomly assigning relative belief values. All the 
Bayesian techniques eventually do worse than assigning relative 
belief values randomly. 
At first these results seem exciting. They demonstrate that 
Bayesian can be outperformed with a simple inference procedure 
even when using a performance criteria (Expected-MSE) that is 
used to axiomatically derive Bayesian procedures. A more careful 
analysis, however, reveals another conclusion. MSE is a poor er­
ror measure. The reasons for this will become apparent below. 
TABLE 2 
EXPECTED-d' RESULTS FOR PROTOTYPICAL EXAMPLE 
Error Simple Strong Naive Strong Proper 
Range linear linear Bayes Bayes Bayes 
- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- --- --
0. 000 1. 37 1.56 1. 90 1. 88 2.32 
0. 200 1. 32 1.50 1.83 1. 80 2.25 
0. 400 1. 32 1.48 1. 76 1. 74 2.08 
0. 600 1.13 1.25 1.48 1.46 1. 76 
0. 800 1.02 1.06 1.24 1.22 1.51 
1. 000 0.70 0.69 0.91 0.89 1. 09 
1. 200 0.41 0.48 0.56 0.56 0.72 
1. 400 0.23 0.31 0.36 0.36 0.45 
1. 600 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.22 
1. 800 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.10 0.11 
2.000 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.02 
Table 2 shows the results for expected-d'. Recall that d' is the 
normalized difference between means of the distributions of 
belief values when the hypothesis is true vs. false. This 
measure.tells a very different story than MSE. Here Proper Bayes 
consistently outperforms the other inference procedures. This 
contrasts sharply with the MSE results. According to the MSE 
measure, at Error Range = 1.2 Proper Bayes does worse than as­
serting 11I don't know -- . 5" under all conditions. The d' 
measure, however, still has the two distribution .72 standard 
deviations apart. 
Although sensitivity (d') is a useful measure, it is also an in­
complete measure. d' is invariant to linear transformations of 
the measurement scale. A belief/probability scale, however, has 
an absolute value interpretation. It is the absolute value on 
this scale that drives behavior. RE is an error measure that is 
sensitive to absolute values. Table 3 compares the various in­
ference procedures in terms of expected-RE. 
The RE measure tells yet another story. Proper Bayes and strong 
Linear consistently outperform the other three methods. Compared 
with each other, Strong·Linear exhibits an arching effect rela­
tive to Proper Bayes. At the extremes, Proper Bayes does better 
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than strong Linear, but for the middle range strong Linear does 
consistently better than Proper Bayes. These results suggests 
that, for the most part, Strong Linear is less likely than Proper 
Bayes to inappropriately output a belief value beyond a decision 
threshold. 
TABLE 3 
EXPECTED-RE RESULTS FOR PROTOTYPICAL EXAMPLE 
Error Simple Strong Naive Strong Proper 
range linear linear Bayes Bayes Bayes 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
0. 000 . 126 . 092 . 122 . 125 . 086 
0. 200 . 133 . 097 . 131 . 134 . 093 
0. 400 . 135 . 101 . 143 . 143 . 110 
0. 600 . 169 . 134 . 182 . 182 . 149 
0. 800 . 187 . 168 . 218 . 221 . 185 
1. 000 . 270 . 224 . 284 . 287 . 258 
1. 200 . 359 . 328 . 361 . 36 3  . 337 
1. 400 . 416 . 387 . 411 . 410 . 394 
1. 600 . 457 . 444 . 455 . 457 . 448 
1. 800 . 480 . 487 . 474 . 476 . 475 
2. 000 . 491 . 496 . 489 . 490 . 494 
By this time the reader may be confused. Using three different 
error measures three entirely different patterns of result ob­
tain. As it turns out, however, these results have a 
straightforward explanation. Figure 1 depicts this explanation 
for the Strong Linear and Proper Bayes techniques. While Proper 
Bayes is the more sensitive, Strong Linear exhibits less variance 
in the calculated belief values. As a result, the decision 
thresholds are farther out on the tails of the Strong Linear dis­
tributions than on the Proper Bayes distributions. It should be 
noted that Figure 1 is also consistent with the result that for 
Strong Linear Pe+Pc was always much lower (around . 4) than for 
Proper Bayes (around . 85) . 
In general, these results suggest that the Strong Linear method 
is a relatively safe, albeit weak, inference procedure. This 
method often returns an intermediate value, but when it does 
return an extreme value (i. e. , strong support) it is less likely 
to be in error than many other techniques -- even Proper Bayes. 
2. 3 Variations on Prototype Example 
The previous section outlined the results for a single run. In 
this section some alternative monte carlo runs are described. 
Because of space limitations, it is not possible to show all the 
results. Instead, I will limit discussion to describing the main 
differences from the prototypical example. 
Marginalized vs. Direct Assessments - The prototypical example 
assumed that inferencing agents were coherent. The inputs into 
the various inference procedures were all derived by marginaliz­
ing over a single underlying distribution of belief values. For 
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instance, to calculate B(H=T / D=T) in the prototypical example, 
we marginalized over the possible states where D=T (i. e. 
B(H=T I D=T) =B(H=T, D=T & ABC) /B(D=T &HABC) ) .  
* 
P(RB(H) 1 -H) * * 
-------> * * 
* 
* 
* 
* * 
* 
L 
'
** 
* 
P(RB(H) j -H) ---> * 
* 
* 
* * 
* * 
L 
* 
* 
* 
* 
** 
* * 
** 
* 
* 
* * 
* * 
* 
* 
u 
P(RB(H) I H) 
<--------
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Relative Belief for Proper Bayes 
**
' 
* * 
* <--- P(RB(H) I H) 
* 
* * 
* * 
* * 
u 
Relative Belief for Strong Linear 
FIGURE 1 
DISTRIBUTIONS OF RELATIVE BELIEF VALUES 
FOR PROPER BAYES AND STRONG LINEAR 
From the perspective of practical applications, this is unrealis­
tic. It suggests that one would elicit from an agent a fully­
specified probability model, accounting for all interactions, and 
then proceed to ignore (marginalize over) much of the elicited 
information to calculate the inputs needed for a simple inference 
procedure. The simple inference procedure does not reduce the 
elicitation burden. A more realistic approach is to directly as­
sess the parameters of interest. For instance, we can let 
B(H=T j D=T) = P(H=T ) D=T) + error. 
Using this approach we obtain a significant reduction in the 
elicitation burden. 
The results for this variation are similar to the prototypical 
case. The main difference occurred for expected-RE measure where 
the arching effect was much less pronounced. This is shown in 
Table 4. 
When true probabilities do not exist - The prototypical case as­
sumed that for each evidential state there was a true probability 
that the hypothesis was true. Although convenient, this assump-
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tion is not required. An alternative approach to calibration er­
ror is to look at the relative frequency of truths at each level 
of belief. To illustrate, suppose someone solves a set of 50 
hierarchical inference problems, each unique. Over the set of 
problems the person expresses a belief value of .6 on 100 in­
stances. Of the set of 100 propositions, for which a belief 
value of .6 was expressed, what proportion were true? If the 
proportion was .6, then the person was well calibrated. If the 
proportion was .1, then the person was poorly calibrated. By 
setting up an error distribution for the proportion of truths at 
each level of belief, calibration error can be introduced without 
assuming that belief values are an assessment of true probability 
values. 
TABLE 4 
EXPECTED-RE RESULTS FOR DIRECT ASSESSMENT CASE 
Error Simple strong Naive Strong Proper 
Range linear linear Bayes Bayes Bayes 
-
--
-- ----- -----
-
---- ----- -----
0. 000 . 125 . 085 . 128 . 122 .081 
0.200 .135 .098 .134 .137 .100 
0. 400 . 145 . 113 . 157 . 159 .115 
0.600 .168 .148 .195 .197 .147 
0. 800 . 221 . 215 . 258 . 260 . 200 
1. 000 . 276 .268 .312 . 282 .250 
1.200 .364 . 345 .377 .374 . 326 
1.400 .417 .402 .417 .419 .396 
1.600 .480 .475 .482 .481 .466 
1. 800 .485 .481 .492 .490 .489 
2.000 .493 .496 .491 .492 .489 
More formally we have the following situation. For a given level 
of belief, say b, there is a set of pairs of expressions 
{(x1, y1) ,  ... , (xn, y� )} where for each pair B(xi i Yi) =b. A pair 
is labeled true ir x1 & yi is true and false if -xi & yi is true. 
All pairs are either true or false. 3 Let the proportion of 
truths in this set be p. If we are willing to assume exchan­
gability then P(xi l yi&"B(xi l yi) =b") =p. Here p - b is the 
calibration error for level b. 
The results for this variation are shown in Table 5. Everything 
else is the same as before. Once again the results are similar 
to the prototypical example, although the arching effect for RE 
is a little less pronounced. 
Hierarchical Networks - In AI, most inference systems are based 
on hierarchical inference models. The previous cases were all 
3. The reader may find it convenient to think of the truth value 
of an (xi,yi) pair in terms of counterfactuals. (xi, yi) is true 
on condition that if yi were true, then xi would also be true. I 
don't really need counterfactuals to develop this discussion, but 
I don't have the space here to explain how to get around them. 
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two levels networks with no intermediate nodes. A simple way to 
introduce hierarchical inference into the prototypical example is 
to remove one of the evidence items, but leave the structure the 
same. For example, we reran the prototypical case with A removed 
as an evidence item. The MSE and d' results are once again 
similar to the prototypical case, but in contrast to the previous 
two cases, the arching effect for RE was magnified. This is 
shown in Table 6. 
TABLE 5 
EXPECTED-RE RESULTS FOR CASE WHERE TRUE PROBABILITY 
DOES NOT EXIST 
Error 
range 
0. 000 
0. 500 
1. 000 
1. 500 
2. 000 
Simple 
linear 
. 122 
. 159 
.284 
. 425 
. 487 
Strong Naive 
linear Bayes 
.089 
. 126 
.260 
. 421 
. 485 
. 117 
. 174 
. 308 
. 436 
. 495 
TABLE 6 
Strong 
Bayes 
. 119 
. 176 
. 309 
. 440 
. 497 
Proper 
Bayes 
. 081 
. 138 
. 262 
. 404 
. 464 
EXPECTED-RE RESULTS FOR HIERARCHICAL MODEL 
Error 
range 
0. 000 
0. 500 
1. 000 
1. 500 
2. 000 
Simple 
linear 
. 183 
. 241 
. 326 
. 476 
. 506 
Strong 
linear 
. 100 
. 140 
. 252 
. 445 
. 504 
Naive 
Bayes 
. 142 
. 185 
. 298 
. 458 
. 505 
Strong 
Bayes 
. 144 
. 185 
. 304 
. 453 
. 504 
Proper 
Bayes 
. 119 
. 168 
. 290 
. 443 
.506 
Other Variations - The above results represent a small subset of 
the variations we have explored. These variations include alter­
native ways of specifying the probability of each possible state, 
introducing calibration error and varying thresholds. Although 
the numbers may change, the patterns of results shown above are 
generally stable. 
In addition to varying the above runs, we are in the process of 
examining a variety of other inference procedures -- including 
the use of default rules, interval probabilities with Bayesian 
and Shaferian updates, as well as some hybrid schemes. 
3.0 DISCUSSION 
For the techniques studied here, Proper Bayes is robustly the 
most sensitive in discriminating true vs. false instances of a 
hypothesis. From the perspective of relative error, however, 
simply adding up the number of strong evidence items for vs. 
against an inference is generally safe. If this simple technique 
strongly supports an inference, then that inference is probably 
correct. Indeed, this simple inference technique is less likely 
179 
to make an error in inference than a simplified Bayesian tech­
niques and is often superior to proper Bayesian techniques. 
As a final note, the reader may be curious as to how these 
results relate to the notion of higher order uncertainty (see 
Kyburg, 1988 for discussion) . In particular, one might suppose 
that the results would have been different if we had allowed the 
Bayesian procedures to incorporate a probability distribution 
over the probability estimates. This supposition is both correct 
and irrelevant. To see this, consider the case where the 
higher-order probabilities are correct (i. e. , accurately reflect 
the random process in the monte carlo simulation) . In this cir­
cumstance, the expected probability of the hypothesis given each 
evidential state would then also reflect the true probability of 
each state -- and we are back in the zero calibration error con­
dition. More generally the notion of probabilities of probabil­
ities simply recurses the problem of calibration error, and 
doesn't really contribute to our understanding of the performance 
of different inference procedures. 
An alternative approach to something like higher-order uncer­
tainty is to perform a probability analysis of the characteris­
tics of alternative uncertain inference procedures. Such an 
analysis can be used to identify characteristics of inference 
procedures that are independent of the probabilistic characteris­
tics of an inference domain (i. e. , generalizable results) , as 
well as characteristics that seem to be context specific. This 
paper is an example of such an analysis. 
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